Leave the system's actual behavior untouched and instead alter what the observer perceives: inserting fictitious events, substituting or deleting observed ones, or more general modifications.
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Synthesis of Insertion Functions for Enforcement of Opacity Security Properties
The insertion-function mechanism proposed here is extended by several later entries of this section (edit and modification functions).
classical · insertion-functions · opacity
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Opacity is a confidentiality property that characterizes whether a “secret” of a system can be inferred by an outside observer called an “intruder”. In this paper, we consider the problem of enforcing opacity in systems modeled as partially-observed finite-state automata. We propose a novel enforcement mechanism based on the use of insertion functions. An insertion function is a monitoring interface at the output of the system that changes the system’s output behavior by inserting additional observable events. We define the property of “i-enforceability” that an insertion function needs to satisfy in order to enforce opacity. I-enforceability captures an insertion function’s ability to respond to every system’s observed behavior and to output only modified behaviors that look like existing non-secret behaviors. Given an insertion function, we provide an algorithm that verifies whether it is i-enforcing. More generally, given an opacity notion, we determine whether it is i-enforceable or not by constructing a structure called the “All Insertion Structure” (AIS). The AIS enumerates all i-enforcing insertion functions in a compact state transition structure. If a given opacity notion has been verified to be i-enforceable, we show how to use the AIS to synthesize an i-enforcing insertion function.
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Synthesis of Optimal Insertion Functions for Opacity Enforcement
classical · insertion-functions · opacity
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Our prior work has studied the enforcement of opacity security properties using insertion functions. Given a system that is not opaque, the so-called All Insertion Structure (AIS) is a game structure, played by the system and the insertion function, that embeds all valid insertion functions. In this paper, we first propose a more compact AIS that can be constructed with lower computational complexity. We then introduce the maximum total cost and the maximum mean cost, and use them as quantitative objectives to solve for optimal insertion functions. Specifically, we first determine if an insertion function with a finite total cost exists. If such an insertion function exists, we synthesize an optimal total-cost insertion function. Otherwise, we construct an optimal mean-cost insertion function. In either case, we find an optimal insertion strategy on the AIS, with respect to the corresponding cost objective. The algorithmic procedures are adapted from results developed for minimax games and mean payoff games. The resulting optimal strategy is represented as a subgraph of the AIS that consists of all the system actions and the optimal insertion actions. Finally, we use this subgraph to synthesize an optimal insertion function that is encoded as an I/O automaton.
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Enforcement of Opacity by Public and Private Insertion Functions
classical · insertion-functions · opacity
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We study the enforcement of opacity, an information-flow security property, using insertion functions that insert fictitious events at the output of the system. The intruder is characterized as a passive external observer whose malicious goal is to infer system secrets from observed traces of system events. We consider the problems of enforcing opacity under the assumption that the intruder either knows or does not know the structure of the insertion function; we term this requirement as public–private enforceability. The case of private enforceability alone, where the intruder does not know the form of the insertion function, is solved in our prior work. In this paper, we address the stronger requirement of public–private enforceability, that requires opacity be preserved even if the intruder knows or discovers the structure of the insertion function. We formulate the concept of public–private enforceability by defining the notion of public safety. This leads to the notion of public–private enforcing (PP-enforcing) insertion functions. We then identify a necessary and sufficient condition for an insertion function to be PP-enforcing. We further show that if opacity is privately enforceable by the insertion mechanism, then it is also public–private enforceable. Using these results, we present a new algorithm to synthesize PP-enforcing insertion functions by a greedy-maximal strategy. This algorithm is the first of its kind to guarantee opacity when insertion functions are made public or discovered by the intruder.
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Insertion Functions with Memory for Opacity Enforcement
Not to be confused with the similarly named K-Memory-Embedded Insertion Mechanism paper by Liu, Mei and Lu, which is by a different group.
classical · insertion-functions · opacity
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We investigate the enforcement of opacity, an information-flow privacy property, using insertion sequences that modify the output of the system by event insertions. Previous work considered the problem of enforcing opacity under the assumption that the insertion functions were based on the observed system strings. Now, we investigate an extension of the previous method introducing a k-memory insertion mechanism. In this case, we store k consecutive events and we compute an insertion function for a k length event sequence. The k-memory insertion mechanism can be applied to a broader class of systems than the previously proposed insertion mechanism. The first contribution of this paper is the introduction of ik-enforceability. A system is ik-enforceable if we can apply k-memory insertion mechanism to enforce privacy. The second contribution of this paper is the development of a verification algorithm for ik-enforceability.
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Opacity Enforcement Using Nondeterministic Publicly-Known Edit Functions
classical · insertion-functions · opacity
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This note investigates enforcement of opacity by nondeterministic edit functions. The edit functions alter the system's output by inserting fictitious events or erasing observed events. The edit decisions are randomly made while not known by the outside environment a priori. There is an intruder characterized as a passive observer with malicious goals to infer the secrets of the system. We require that opacity be enforced when the intruder may or may not know the implementation of edit functions. This requirement is termed as private and public safety. We also restrict the operation of edit functions by defining edit constraints. Then, the opacity enforcement problem is transformed to a three-player game among the edit function, the environment, and a dummy player, which helps to determine edit decisions. A game structure called the all edit structure (AES) is introduced to characterize the interaction among those players. It embeds all privately safe edit functions and may also embed publicly safe edit functions. Based on the AES, we present an algorithm that provably synthesizes nondeterministic edit functions that satisfy both private safety and public safety.
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Enforcing Opacity by Insertion Functions Under Multiple Energy Constraints
classical · insertion-functions · opacity
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This paper investigates the enforcement of opacity by insertion functions subject to multiple quantitative constraints capturing resource or energy limitations. There is a malicious intruder attempting to infer secrets of the system from its observations. To prevent the disclosure of secrets, the insertion function inserts fictitious events to the output of the system to obfuscate the intruder. The system is initialized with several types of resources, referred to as energy. The energy is consumed or replenished with event occurrences while always consumed with event insertions. The insertion function must enforce opacity while ensuring that each type of resource is never depleted. This problem is then reduced to a two-player game between the insertion function and the system (environment), with properly defined objectives. A game structure called the Energy Insertion Structure, denoted by EIS is proposed, which provably contains solutions to the energy constrained opacity enforcement problem. Then we further study the bounded cost rate insertion problem on the insertion function’s winning region of EIS, which requires that the long run average rate of insertion cost be bounded. This problem is formulated as a multidimensional mean payoff game and a special method called hyperplane separation technique is applied to efficiently solve it.
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Embedded Insertion Functions for Opacity Enforcement
classical · insertion-functions · opacity
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We investigate the enforcement of opacity, an information-flow privacy property, using insertion sequences that modify the output of the system by event insertions. Previous work considered the problem of enforcing the opacity under the assumption that the insertion functions were based on the observed system strings. Now, we investigate the more powerful method of insertion sequences based on the exact system states and events. In this case, the insertion function would be embedded into the system itself, rather than being an output interface. In this article, we develop methods that verify if a valid insertion function exists in this setting; if one exists, synthesize one using a computationally effective algorithm; and investigate a special case where it is possible to verify and synthesize a valid embedded insertion function with polynomial complexity in the size of the system.
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Compositional and Abstraction-Based Approach for Synthesis of Edit Functions for Opacity Enforcement
classical · insertion-functions · opacity
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This paper develops a novel compositional and abstraction-based approach to synthesize edit functions for opacity enforcement in modular discrete event systems. Edit functions alter the output of the system by erasing or inserting events in order to obfuscate the outside intruder, whose goal is to infer the secrets of the system from its observation. We synthesize edit functions to solve the opacity enforcement problem in a modular setting, which significantly reduces the computational complexity compared with the monolithic approach. Two abstraction methods called opaque observation equivalence and opaque bisimulation are first employed to abstract the individual components of the modular system and their observers. Subsequently, we propose a method to transform the synthesis of edit functions to the calculation of modular supremal nonblocking supervisors. We show that the edit functions synthesized in this manner correctly solve the opacity enforcement problem.
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K-Memory-Embedded Insertion Mechanism for Opacity Enforcement
classical · insertion-functions · opacity
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Opacity is a privacy property which aims to determine whether the “secret” of a system can be deduced by an outside intruder. In this paper, we investigate the enforcement of opacity using insertion functions which insert additional events if necessary to modify the output of the system. Inspired by the existing insertion mechanisms, we propose a mechanism named k-memory-embedded insertion mechanism for the enforcement of opacity. In our k-memory-embedded insertion mechanism, the insertion functions are determined based on the knowledge of system’s exact states and the stored next sequence of events with length k. Especially, we define the property of ik-E-enforceability that a k-memory-embedded insertion function needs to satisfy for opacity enforcement, and further construct a verifier to determine whether a given opacity notion of the system is ik-E-enforceable or not. Our mechanism improves the embedded insertion mechanism by applying to a broader class of systems. Also, we improve the k-memory insertion mechanism by requiring a smaller number of consecutive events which need to be stored.
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Enforcement of K-Step Opacity with Edit Functions
classical · insertion-functions · opacity
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Opacity is an information flow property for dynamic systems describing plausible deniability, that is whether an eavesdropper can deduce that "secret" behavior has occurred. In particular, K-step opacity considers secret actions that have occurred within the last K-steps in the past. We consider the problem of K-step opacity enforcement over automata using obfuscation. We present a general framework for K-step opacity enforcement and transform the problem of enforcing K-step opacity to enforcing current-state opacity. We can then apply existing obfuscation synthesis methods for current-state opacity to K-step opacity. We demonstrate this approach by enforcing privacy in the context of a novel contact tracing model.
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Extended Insertion Functions for Opacity Enforcement in Discrete-Event Systems
classical · insertion-functions · opacity
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Opacity is a confidentiality property that holds if certain secret behavior of a system, typically represented by a predicate, cannot be revealed under any system evolution. Among other proposed methodologies, when opacity is violated, it can be enforced using insertion mechanisms, i.e., by inserting symbols before an actual system output (in real time as the system evolves) in order to replace observation sequences that lead to opacity violations with observation sequences that can be generated by system behavior that does not violate opacity. This article focuses on opacity enforcement in discrete-event systems modeled with finite-state automata and proposes an extended insertion mechanism that can enforce opacity in a practical manner to a wide class of systems by inserting symbols before and after an actual system output. This article also introduces event insertion constraints that require only certain specific symbols to be inserted before and after an actual system output. For each case, we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition (based on the construction of an appropriate verifier) for opacity enforceability using the proposed extended insertion mechanism and devise a pertinent extended insertion strategy.
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Enforcement for Infinite-Step Opacity and K-Step Opacity via Insertion Mechanism
classical · insertion-functions · opacity
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Opacity is an important information-flow property concerning the security and privacy of cyber–physical systems. We investigate the synthesis problem of infinite-step opacity and K-step opacity by using insertion function. An insertion function is a monitoring interface placed between the system and the outside observer that inserts fictitious events to the system output if necessary. To successfully enforce infinite-step opacity and K-step opacity, in this paper, we first review the insertion mechanism without considering the opacity enforcement issue, and propose two new automata for recognizing the safe languages for infinite-step opacity and K-step opacity respectively. Then, we enforce the infinite-step opacity and the K-step opacity with the reviewed insertion mechanism. Computational complexity issues are also discussed. Our results extend the prior results about the synthesis of insertion functions from the notion of current-state opacity to the notions of infinite-step opacity and K-step opacity.
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Opacity Enforcement via Attribute-Based Edit Functions in the Presence of an Intended Receiver
classical · insertion-functions · opacity
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The enforcement of opacity, a security property concerning information-flow, has been investigated using edit functions, which are capable of manipulating the output of the system via insertion, replacement, and erasure operations on its symbols, in order to ensure that an outside observer (the intruder) does not gain access to critical system information. In this article, we consider situations where an intended receiver may be present and develop attribute-based edit functions, which not only obfuscate the output for the intruder, but also allow the intended receiver (who is assumed to have access to specific additional information) to recover the original output behavior. In our developed edit mechanism, edit functions modify the output by only performing insertion or replacement operations under a carefully chosen replacement regulation. Moreover, the outside observer that satisfies the intended-receiver attribute (i.e., the identity of the observer is the intended receiver) is able to recover the unedited output sequence using its ability to distinguish inserted/replaced symbols, and its knowledge of the replacement regulation. We provide an algorithmic procedure, based on a backtracking technique, to obtain suitable replacement regulations for the attribute-based edit function and the intended receiver.
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Edit Mechanism Synthesis for Opacity Enforcement Under Uncertain Observations
classical · insertion-functions · opacity
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This letter addresses the problem of opacity enforcement by using edit functions in discrete event systems modelled as deterministic finite automata under partial observation. The edit function is an output interface of the system that manipulates actual observations to confuse a malicious intruder. We assume that the edit function simply knows whether the intruder observes a larger or smaller set of events than itself, but does not know the exact set of events observed by the intruder. In this uncertain observation setting, the edit function aims to confuse the intruder while relying on its own set of observable events, which requires the edit function to be u-enforcing. The opacity enforcement problem is then transformed to a two-player game between the system and the edit function under partial information. A so-called edit mechanism is proposed in a game scheme to enumerate all possible edited operations following the system behavior. We show that an edit function synthesized from the edit mechanism (if any) can be used to enforce opacity in the system under the uncertain observation setting.
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Opacity Enforcement in Discrete Event Systems Using Extended Insertion Functions Under Inserted Language Constraints
classical · insertion-functions · opacity
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Opacity is a confidentiality property capturing the fact that certain secret behavior of a system cannot be revealed under any system evolution. Current-state opacity can be enforced by using an extended insertion mechanism, which is capable of inserting fake symbols before and after an actual output, in real time as the system evolves. This article studies the enforcement of current-state opacity for systems modeled by finite state automata using an extended insertion strategy under constraints on the way symbols can be inserted before and after an actual symbol generated by the system (e.g., constraints on the type, order, and number of inserted symbols). More specifically, we consider inserted language constraints captured by the notion of (Lb, La)-enforceability, where Lb is the set of strings that can be inserted before, and La is the set of strings that can be inserted after an observed event. If Lb and La are regular languages, a verifier is constructed to derive a necessary and sufficient condition for opacity enforceability, and also to formulate an extended insertion strategy (if viable).
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Privacy-Preserving Co-synthesis Against Sensor-Actuator Eavesdropping Intruder
classical · opacity · supervisory-control
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In this work, we investigate the problem of privacy-preserving supervisory control against an external passive intruder via co-synthesis of dynamic mask, edit function, and supervisor for opacity enforcement and requirement satisfaction. We attempt to achieve the following goals: 1) the system secret cannot be inferred by the intruder, i.e., opacity of secrets against the intruder, and the existence of the dynamic mask and the edit function should not be discovered by the intruder, i.e., covertness of dynamic mask and edit function against the intruder; 2) the closed-loop system behaviors should satisfy some safety and nonblockingness requirement. We assume the intruder can eavesdrop both the sensing information generated by the sensors and the control commands issued to the actuators, and we refer to such an intruder as a sensor-actuator eavesdropping intruder. The effectiveness of our approach is illustrated on an example about the enforcement of location privacy for an autonomous vehicle.
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Opacity Enforcement via Greedy Privately-and-Publicly Known Insertion Functions
classical · insertion-functions · opacity
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In this article, we investigate the enforcement of (current-state) opacity, an important information-flow security property, via insertion functions. An insertion function is an obfuscation mechanism that inserts fictitious events to the outputs in order to confuse the outside observer (intruder) such that the secret of the system is not revealed. In some situations, the secret may be revealed when the insertion mechanism is (or becomes) publicly known. This leads to the problem of synthesizing private-and-public enforcing (PP-enforcing) insertion functions in the sense that opacity is still enforced even when the mechanism is discovered or published by the designer. Existing works that have investigated this synthesis problem are either only sound or have limited applicability as we show in this work. For this reason, and more importantly, to better solve the synthesis problem, a new approach is proposed upon an improved greedy criterion. We show that the proposed algorithm is both sound and complete, and can be used to completely solve the synthesis problem for the PP-enforcing insertion function. With slight modifications of our algorithm, infinite-step opacity and K-step opacity can also be enforced under publicly-known insertion mechanisms.
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Improved Synthesis of Nondeterministic Publicly-Known Edit Functions for Opacity Enforcement
classical · insertion-functions · opacity
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In this paper, we investigate the synthesis problem of edit functions for opacity enforcement in systems modelled as partially-observed finite-state automata. For better plausible deniability for the edit functions, in cases where the intruder may learn/know their existence, a synthesis problem for nondeterministic edit functions under a publicly-known setting was introduced in the literature, but not yet fully solved. In light of this, we revisit the publicly-known edit mechanism by proposing a sound and complete approach for solving the synthesis problem of nondeterministic publicly-known edit functions. For practical applications, the edit function is assumed to have limited erasure and insertion ability. Our approach is based on a new labelled finite-state structure, and results in wider applicability than previously-proposed in the literature.
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Obfuscation Mechanism for Simultaneous Public Event Information Release and Private Event Information Hiding in Discrete Event Systems
classical · insertion-functions · opacity
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In this paper, we study the problem of simultaneous public event information release and private event information hiding in discrete event systems modeled by partially observed non-deterministic finite automata, where the public and private event information is respectively defined as unobservable fault and secret events. The notion of D-C-compossibility is introduced to characterize whether a system simultaneously conceals the occurrences of secret events while releasing the occurrences of fault events. When such a property does not hold, we investigate its enforcement through a defensive function. This function takes each observable event of a system as input and generates a suitably modified event sequence at the system's output using event deletion, insertion, or substitution. Specifically, our focus is on prioritizing the concealment of the secret events while maximizing the detection of the fault events through the use of defensive functions. The notion of D-C-enforceability that refers to the capability of a defensive function to employ a strategy for manipulating observations of a system to enforce D-C-compossibility is proposed. That is, a D-C-enforcing defensive function ensures that all occurrences of fault events can be revealed while concealing all occurrences of secret events. A D-C-diagnoser construction is proposed to enumerate all feasible defensive actions following system behavior. By taking advantage of the D-C-diagnoser, we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for D-C-enforceability, along with a corresponding obfuscation strategy for defensive functions.
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Opacity Enforcement in Discrete Event Systems Using Modification Functions
classical · insertion-functions · opacity
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Opacity of a discrete event system is a confidentiality property that characterizes instances when the secret behavior of the system cannot be revealed. This paper considers current-state opacity with respect to a set of secret states, and addresses the opacity enforcement problem via modification functions that are capable of replacing in real-time the output of the underlying system with another output, aiming to prevent the intruder from inferring the secret. We study modification functions that are constrained, i.e., they may not be able to modify certain outputs or they may have restrictions in how they modify a particular output. A system is said to be emc-enforceable if opacity can be enforced via modification functions under the given event modification constraints (emc). To verify whether a system is emc-enforceable, we construct a verifier, based on which a necessary and sufficient condition is obtained. If a system is emc-enforceable, an algorithm is developed to compute a modification strategy based on the verifier to enforce opacity. For m-enforceability, a special case of emc-enforceability without constraints, two necessary and sufficient conditions to verify and enforce opacity with reduced complexity are presented, one based on a system estimator and the other based on a detector. Note to Practitioners—Discrete event systems provide appropriate mathematical models for analysing information-flow properties of cyber-physical systems, such as intelligent transportation systems, command-control systems, and networked communication systems, in dynamically changing environments. Opacity is a general property capable of capturing safe information-flow in a cyber-physical system. This article targets the enforcement of opacity using modification functions that mask the output of the system into another output in a manner that appears consistent to an external observer as the system evolves. The designed modification function can be realized via triggers equipped with digital logic and storage functionality. As an output is generated by a system, a trigger displays a fake output based on the stored real and fake states.